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Munford responds to the issues raised in Alliance's brief as follows:
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
IS CORRECTNESS,
In it's brief, Alliance accurately states that the standard of review is "correctness"
because the matter was decided on stipulated facts. (Appellee's Brief, pg. 1.) Alliance
then contends that Munford failed to meet her burden to "marshall the evidence" to show
that "even when reviewed in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the finding under attack." (Appellee's Brief, pg. 1.)
Alliance misapprehends the "correctness" standard. Under that standard, Munford
need only show that the trial court's decision was incorrect. "We review the trial court's
conclusion for correctness, granting them no deference." Workman vs. Brighton
Properties, 976 P.2d 1209, 1210 (Utah App. 1999). There is no "marshaling the
evidence" requirement under the correctness standard. All of the cases cited by Alliance
for the proposition that Munford must "marshall the evidence" were appeals from bench
trials. See Interiors Contracting, Inc. vs. Smith, Halanders and Smith Associates, 881
P.2d 929 (Utah App. 1994); West Valley City vs. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah
App. 1991); Saunders vs. Sharp, 793 P.2d 927 (Utah App. 1990). This matter was
decided on stipulated facts and therefore is a conclusion of law.
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II. THE ONE-ACTION RULE

BARS RECOVERY,
A.

Alliance does not fall within the "sold out" junior lienholder exception.
The issue before the court is whether Alliance falls within the "sold out" junior

lienholder exception to the one-action rule. The Court in City Consumer Services vs.
Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991) held that the one-action rule does not require a junior
lienholder to bid at a foreclosure sale held by a senior lienholder. Therefore, if a
nonbidding junior lienholder becomes unsecured due to foreclosure by the senior
lienholder, that junior lienholder is excepted from the one-action rule. The Peters Court,
however, did not rule on whether a junior lienholder that bids and purchases the property
at a foreclosure sale held by the senior lienholder falls within that exception.
The "fault" analysis used by the Peters Court, that Alliance refers to, is the
rationale for the "sold out" junior lienholder exception. The Peters Court reasoned that if
the junior lienholder participates in a foreclosure sale, it must invest additional funds (the
amount required to pay off the senior lienholder.) Therefore, because the foreclosure sale
is not the "fault" of the junior lienholder, the junior lienholder should not be required to
invest additional funds at the foreclosure sale and therefore the "sold out" junior
lienholder should be exempt from the one-action rule.
If the junior lienholder does participate in the foreclosure sale, then the rationale
for the "sold out" junior lienholder exception disappears. Having already decided to
invest additional funds, the issue of "fault" is no longer relevant. The junior lienholder
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should then be required to "exhaust" the security (i.e., bid in the junior Henholder debt),
before it can pursue alternative means of recovery.
The four categories of "fault" cited from First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v.
Felger, 658 F. Supp. 175, 182 (D. Utah 1987) are not applicable since none of those
situations occurred in this case. The relevant question is whether the "sold out" junior
Henholder exception applies in this case. As discussed above, once a junior Henholder
decides to invest the additional funds required to pay off the senior Henholder, the "fault"
analysis disappears.
Even if a "fault" analysis is used, Alliance is at "fault" for failing to exhaust the
security before pursuing alternative collection remedies. Quoting from Alliance's brief,
"[the one-action rule] requires creditors who are secured in their debts to look first to the
security for repayment of the debt upon default in payment before seeking other means of
recovery." (Appellee's Brief, page 5.) It is Alliance's "fault" for ignoring the one-action
rule. Rather than "looking first to the security for repayment of the debt," Alliance
sought "other means of recovery," to wit, rather than bidding in the junior Henholder debt
at the foreclosure sale, Alliance purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and then
sought to recover on the note by recouping the excess proceeds.
B.

Cowan and Randall are inapposite,
Alliance cites Cowan vs. Stoke, etal.T 115 P.2d 153 (Utah 1991) and Randall vs.

Valley Title, 681 P. 2d 219 (Utah 1984) for the proposition that the excess proceeds
"stand in the place" of the property and a "sold out" junior Henholder has priority to those
3

excess proceeds. Munford does not dispute that, if Alliance is a "sold out" junior
lienholder, then Alliance is entitled to those excess proceeds. However, for the reasons
previously discussed, Alliance does not fall within the "sold out" junior lienholder
exception. Because Alliance did not "exhaust" the security first, Alliance is now barred
from alternative means of recovery.
C.

Alliance could have bid in all or part of its junior lienholder debt.
Alliance makes the absurd allegation that "Munford is also apparently alleging that

a junior lienholder should be forced to bid the entire amount of the debt owed to it at the
Senior's foreclosure sale." (Appellee's Brief, page 11). Alliance could have bid in all QL
part of the amount owed on its junior lien. In Peters, the court recognized that a
lienholder can "bid in [any] amount." See Peters, 815 P.2d at 236, citing Roseleaf Corp.
vs. Chierighino, 378 P.2d 97 (Calif. 1963).
Alliance's allegation that "the only way for a junior lienholder to participate in a
senior lienholder's foreclosure sale is to bid as any other third party" is equally absurd.
(Appellee's Brief, page 11.) Alliance had two choices, to bid "as any other third party"or
to bid in its junior lienholder debt. In bidding as a third-party, Alliance simply bid in a
cash purchase price along with the other bidders and the highest bid was accepted. If
Alliance bid in its junior lienholder debt, the senior lienholder debt is paid in cash, and
Alliance then credit bids the junior lienholder debt (all or part).
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Alliance argues that credit bids are not allowed in Utah. Again, this is not true:
The purchaser at the sale must immediately pay the price bid. It is
generally held that payment may be by credit as well as cash if credit
is acceptable to the trustee and the beneficiary, the policy being that
generally a sale on credit will produce a better price than a sale for
cash. However, one case held a sale on credit unacceptable as being
beyond the powers of the trustee where the trustee was required by the
trust deed to sell for cash upon default. The only provision regarding
this in the Utah statute appears in the statutory form for the Notice of
Trustee's Sale, which states: "Purchase price payable in lawful money
of the United States". It is unclear whether that provision precludes
payment by credit. Beneficiaries, of course, may make bids up to the
amount of the debt owed them without putting up any cash. A bid for
the full amount of the debt is termed a "full credit bid/'
Thomas, D.A. and Beckman, J.H., Thomas and Beckman on Utah Real Property Law;
Lexis Law Publishing, 791-92 (1999). (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, Alliance did have an option to bid in its junior Henholder debt, but choose
not to do so. As the beneficiary under the second trust deed, Alliance may "make bids up
to the amount of the debt owed them without putting up any cash." It should be noted
that every Henholder holding a foreclosure sale credit bids its debt.
D.

Alliance preserved its cause of action and escaped the statutory limitations.
A "sold out" junior Henholder escapes the "fair market value" limitation and the

three-month statute of limitation on deficiency judgements imposed by Section 57-1-32.
Peters, 815 P.2d at 239. If Alliance is treated as a "sold out" junior Henholder, by bidding
on its own account rather than bidding in the junior Henholder debt Alliance has obtained
the security and avoided both statutory limitations on pursuing the balance due against the
debtor.
5

Alliance argues that the statutory limitations would not have applied in any event,
since they apply only to the foreclosing party. This is not true. If Alliance would have
bid in the junior lienholder debt and purchased the property, the limitations of Section
57-1-32 would have applied. The two cases cited by Appellee hold that the limitations of
Section 57-1-32 do not apply to "sold out" junior lienholders. In Sanders vs. Ovard, 838
P.2d 1134 (Utah 1992), the Court stated "[a]s we also noted in Peters, if the second
mortgage is not secured as a result of the seniors foreclosure, the deficiency statute does
not apply because the second suit is not for a deficiency." LL at 1136 (Emphasis added.)
Had Alliance bid in the junior lienholder debt at the sale, any subsequent suit would have
been for a "deficiency" and the limitations of Section 57-1-32 would have applied.
ITT. ALLIANCE'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S
FEES IS FRIVOLOUS,
Finally, Alliance's claim that this appeal is frivolous is, itself, frivolous.
Accordingly, Munford should be awarded her attorney's fees for having to respond to that
claim. At the foreclosure sale, Alliance had no duty to bid and had it not done so, would
have been entitled to the excess proceeds as a "sold out" junior lienholder. Once Alliance
elected to participate in the sale, Alliance could have bid in all or part of its junior
lienholder debt, thereby "exhausting" the security as it is required to do under one-action
rule. In that case, there would have been no excess proceeds and Alliance could have
sued Munford for the deficiency, subject to the limitations of Section 57-1-32. Instead,
Alliance bid as a third-party and purchased the property at the sale. If Alliance is treated
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as a "sold out" junior lienholder, exempt from the one-action rule, every junior lienholder
bidding at a foreclosure sale will follow this pattern. Alliance will have obtained the
security, recovered of the excess it paid over the amount needed to retire the senior
lienholder debt, and as a "sold out" junior lienholder, Alliance will have retained its right
to sue for the balance due on the promissory note, unfettered by either the "fair market
value" limitation or the three-month limitation imposed by Section 57-1-32.
If Alliance wins this appeal, Alliance will have Ms. Munford's house, will have
the excess proceeds, and Jon James Badger (the debtor on the junior lien) can fully expect
to be sued for the balance owing on the promissory note (approximately $30,000). Even
though the house appraised for approximately $110,000 at the time of sale and Alliance
purchased the house for $66,000 at sale, Mr. Badger will not be able to raise the defense
that Alliance purchased the house for less than "fair market value" since a "sold out"
junior lienholder is exempt from that limitation. Alliance will have the house and the
excess proceeds and Mr. Badger will stand defenseless before Alliance for a suit on the
balance due on the promissory note. This abuse of the system was not what the
legislature intended when it adopted the one-action rule. If this procedure is sanctioned, it
will be adopted by every junior lienholder in Utah.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Munford requests that this court reverse the trial court and award Ms.
Munford the excess proceeds, together with interest at the prejudgement rate (10%) from
the date of disbursement. In addition, Ms Munford requests an award of her attorney's
7

fees for responding to that portion of the Appellee's Brief that alleged this appeal was
frivolous on the grounds that such claims were, themselves, frivolous.
Dated this "2£> day of January 2000

Cussell A. Cline
Attorney for Appellant
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